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Abstract 
Purpose 
This study analyses the role of ownership characteristics in a firm’s choice of alternative 
seasoned equity offering methods, offer price discounts and market reactions to such 
announcements within the UK setting. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
Our study examines 697 seasoned equity offerings events of firms traded in the UK during the 
period 1998 to 2012 using multivariate and binomial logistic regression models. Ordinary least 
square models are also used to examine how ownership variables affect offer price discounts 
and stock market performance during the announcement of such corporate events. 
 
Findings 
We show that placings and open offers are the preferred methods for issuing equity by firms 
with higher managerial ownership. Thus, our evidence strongly supports the prediction of the 
entrenched management hypothesis. Moreover, the probability of choosing a combination of 
placings and open offers is also found to be significantly related to issue size, offer discount, 
leverage and previous stock performance. Our results show that pre-issue market conditions 
have a significant effect on the choice of issue method with rights offers and the combination of 
placings and open offers primarily utilised by firms for issuing equity during hot market 
periods. 
 
Originality 
Unlike prior seasoned equity offerings’ studies in the UK that predominantly concentrate on 
the use of rights offers and placings, this study examines, for the first time, the link between 
open offers and the combination of placings and open offers with ownership concentration. We 
also investigate how offer price discounts are related to the firms’ ownership structure, various 
company micro-characteristics and the wider market conditions. 
 
Keywords: Ownership structure, seasoned equity offerings, issue method, market timing 
JEL Codes: G14, G30 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the link between ownership 
structure and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that institutional 
owners appear to be better at identifying above-average SEOs, since evidence shows increased 
share allocation for institutional shareholdings in SEOs with better long-term market 
performance, indicating a possible information advantage. This evidence is corroborated by 
Demiralp et al. (2011), who find a positive relation between institutional ownership and 
long-run stock price performance. They also provide evidence of great improvements in the 
operating performance of SEOs with higher institutional ownership, further supporting the 
positive role of monitoring in the context of SEOs. As theory suggests, the monitoring of 
management can constrain potential opportunism in corporate policy decision making 
(managerial entrenchment). 
Furthermore, firms with active monitors tend to choose the issue method that maximizes 
shareholder interests. For example, as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest, the use of placings 
(PLs) as a method of equity issue can strengthen management’s monitoring by creating large 
shareholders with an incentive to monitor. However, if the firm already has suitable monitors, 
the benefit of adding one more through a PL will be lower. In this case, the probability of firms 
implementing SEOs by means of PLs is expected to decrease. Nonetheless, PLs can mitigate 
the problem of managerial moral hazard by raising the probability of a value-increasing 
takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Wruck, 1989). Eckbo and Masulis (1992) argue that 
instead of PLs the use of rights offers (ROs) may fully solve the underinvestment problem if all 
existing shareholders exercise 100% of their rights. However, it becomes costly to issue equity 
through an RO with lower shareholder participation, especially for an undervalued firm, due to 
wealth transfers from existing shareholders to new shareholders. Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
propose private placements as a solution to this possible underinvestment problem. They argue 
 3 
that a private PL is a value certification from informed investors. The informed investor 
confirms firm value by agreeing to purchase a large fraction of new shares. Barclay et al. (2007) 
find that private placements can assist management in reinforcing their control of a firm, the 
rationale being that this issue method choice is often made to friendly investors who will not 
‘rock the boat’, leading to a more entrenched management. 
In contrast to US studies, prior research on UK SEOs has mainly focused on the choice of 
method used to issue equity, such as ROs and PLs, as well as the market reaction to the 
announcements of these SEOs. For example, Slovin et al. (2000) find that an RO has a 
significantly negative effect on a firm’s stock price, while a PL has a significantly positive 
effect
1
. Using a different sample period, Barnes and Walker (2006) provide significant 
evidence of a relationship between issue method choice and ownership type with increased 
institutional ownership being associated with a decreased probability for a PL and increased 
directors’ ownership being positively related to the use of PLs. These results generally fit 
neatly into the literature on information asymmetry issues within the context of SEOs. 
However, no study so far has examined the link between alternative SEO methods and 
ownership type within the UK especially with regard to the use of the non-standard 
approaches of open offers and the combination of placings and open offers. Our study fills 
this gap by examining the choice of alternative issue methods, including i) ROs, ii) PLs, 
iii) open offers (OOs), and iv) OOs combined with PLs (PLOOs), and how these are related to 
a firm’s ownership structure. In particular, results on the use of the last two methods, OO and 
PLOOs, and their link to ownership concentration within the UK setting are examined for the 
first time in the literature
2
. Moreover, this study extends Barnes and Walker (2006)’s 
investigation by testing the effects of ownership structure on the price setting and 
                                                 
1 A comprehensive discussion of prior empirical evidence on RO in the US and UK is given by Armitage (1998). 
2 Although Barnes and Walker (2006) investigated the relationship between issuance method choice and ownership 
concentration in the UK, their sample was restricted to the use of ROs and PL only. 
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announcement returns of SEOs but also the link between the choice of SEO method with the 
wider market conditions. Our results show that PLs are the preferred method for issuing equity 
by firms with higher managerial ownership and the most likely SEO choice for firms with 
lower institutional ownership that aim to improve monitoring. This evidence strongly supports 
the prediction of the entrenched management hypothesis. Furthermore, the probability of 
choosing a PL is found to be significantly related to issue size, offer discount, and previous 
stock performance. For example, firms with smaller offer sizes, higher discounts, and better 
stock performance are more likely to use PLs.  
Interestingly, our results also suggest that pre-issue market conditions have a significant effect 
on the choice of issue method. A placing is the first choice for firms that conduct SEOs in a 
‘cold’ market but is less likely to be chosen in a ‘hot’ market. This result supports the argument 
that firms are willing to conduct equity issues when they are overvalued
3
. Lastly, our findings 
on the influence of ownership structure on the link between the SEO price-setting process and 
subsequent announcement returns suggest a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and SEO discounts, evidence consistent with the private benefit prediction of the 
controlling hypothesis
4
.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical 
background and introduces our testable hypotheses. Section3 describes the data and 
methodology, while section 4 discusses the main findings from the empirical results. The study 
concludes in section 5. 
                                                 
3
Existing literature suggests that a hot market is highly associated with overoptimistic investors and overvalued 
equity (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Given the argument that using a PL is a proxy for value certification (Hertzel 
and Smith, 1993), SEOs in a hot market are then more likely to be motivated by firm overvaluation. 
4
The controlling hypothesis suggests that a share’s public float and market liquidity should decrease with the 
ownership of controlling shareholders (Rubin, 2007). Hence, such firms should offer a higher discount to 
compensate investors for investing in illiquid stock. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Development of Hypotheses  
In practice, UK firms making a seasoned equity offer can choose from four flotation methods: 
ROs, PLs, OOs, and PLOOs. Both ROs and OOs give existing shareholders pre-emption rights 
to purchase new shares in proportion to their existing holdings. However, unlike the case of 
OOs where the entitlement (pre-emption right) is not tradable and therefore available only to 
existing shareholders, a RO allows existing shareholders to sell these rights to other investors if 
they do not want to exercise any or just part of their pre-emption rights. This pre-emption right 
in a RO and an OO aims to protect existing shareholders’ wealth and control. Alternatively, in 
a PL, the lead underwriter or broker commits to buy all of the new shares from the issuing firm 
at a given price and then places the shares directly with outside investors, primarily institutions. 
Therefore, a placing can induce a major ownership change, while ownership structure after a 
rights issue will be relatively unaltered. Most open offers in the UK are made in conjunction 
with a conditional placing, which is called a PLOO. Typically, in this type of offer, the shares 
are placed by an underwriter or directly with institutions or other investors, subject to recall for 
21 days by shareholders that exercise their pre-emption rights
5
. 
To capture the different incentives of various investors, we propose two ownership variables, 
managerial share ownership and institutional ownership. To capture the incentives of 
entrenched managers, we apply managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the 
ownership of executive and non-executive directors. Prior studies show that managerial 
ownership plays an important role in the choice of the share issue method. For example, the 
increased presence of outside blockholders that comes with both PLs and ROs may lead to 
enhanced monitoring to constrain the scale of managerial opportunism (Hillier and McColgan, 
2008). As such, entrenched managers, unwilling to accept such monitoring pressure (Shleifer 
                                                 
5
A detailed discussion on the main characteristics of all ROs, OOs, PLs, and PLOOs is presented in Slovin et al. 
(2000); Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005); Wu and Wang (2005); and Barnes and Walker (2006). 
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and Vishny, 1986) will more likely choose PLs as the method of issue as it allows management 
the flexibility to choose whichever blockholder they perceive to be in line with their own 
interests.  Barclay et al. (2007) propose that this equity issue method is often made to passive 
investors, thereby helping management maintain its control of the firm
6
.  
To explore the role of institutional investors in the choice of SEO method, we constructed an 
institutional ownership variable. This is measured as the sum of the shares held by all 
institutional investors whose shareholding is over 3% of the firm’s shares. According to the 
monitoring hypothesis, institutional ownership, as a proxy for the monitoring of management, 
plays an important role in corporate governance. In the SEO process, institutional investors are 
the major target in book-building activities. In the UK, PLs are the most commonly used issue 
method that can create a monitoring incentive by adding institutional investors. In this setting, 
a PL will be preferred when institutional ownership is lower. Based on the discussion above, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to choose a placing 
as the equity issue method. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms with lower institutional ownership are more likely to choose a placing as 
the equity issue method. 
 
Regarding the role of ownership in SEO discounts and announcement returns, managerial 
ownership concentration poses an extra risk for the new shareholder, which is the possibility of 
a combined case of managerial entrenchment with a large controlling interest. This could not 
                                                 
6
Existing theory suggests that managers seek target investors, usually affiliated institutional investors, to 
participate in PLs. Such target investors should vote with managers on decisions of corporate policy, leading to a 
more entrenched management (Barclay et al., 2007; Armitage, 2010). 
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only lead to lower market liquidity but also to high undiversified holding risk and therefore 
increased cost of equity ( Barclay et al., 2007). In this setting, the offer price discount should be 
larger in such firms leading us to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with high managerial ownership will price offers at a higher discount 
resulting in lower announcement return during the SEO event. 
 
Given the fact that institutional investors are one of the major investor groups, their role in 
SEOs has become an important question in academic research. According to the manipulative 
trading hypothesis (Kyle, 1985; Gerard and Nanda, 1993), institutional investors attempt to 
trade the stock strategically as they receive private information prior to a public announcement. 
Institutional investors may sell the stock when they receive positive private information and 
thus pre-SEO stock prices will fall, resulting in a higher offer discount. Although there is a 
reduction in value due to such short-term price manipulation before the SEO, institutional 
investors can benefit from the large allocation of new shares at the lower offer price and then 
sell these allocations after the SEO. In this case, SEO discount is intended to compensate 
uninformed investors, an outcome that is consistent with the ‘winner’s curse’ hypothesis in the 
IPO allocation process (Rock, 1986). This hypothesis implies that institutional investor trading 
behaviour acts in the opposite direction to private information. 
However, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find the opposite result, that institutional investors are 
likely to buy the issuing firm’s stock before the SEO if they possess positive private 
information
7
. This result can be interpreted through the information production hypothesis. 
When institutional investors identify a good offer from private information, they have an 
                                                 
7 By investigating the institutional investor’s trading behaviour before and after the SEO, the authors found that the pre-SEO 
net buying of institutional investors is associated with greater SEO allocation and more institutional investors’ post-offer net 
buying, where net buying is measured as total institutional buying minus the sale of the SEO firm’s shares. 
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incentive to participate in this offer and request more allocations. To lower the risk of SEO 
failure, institutional investors will provide the issuing firm or underwriter with information 
regarding market demand. Such information production effectively decreases the information 
asymmetry between the issuing firm and its shareholders. This facilitates SEO price setting 
and the offer discount can be set at a reduced level. 
According to the monitoring hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), institutional ownership, 
as a proxy for the monitoring of management, plays an important role in corporate governance. 
Higher institutional ownership can improve shareholder value by constraining managerial 
discretion to waste corporate resources through inefficient investment. Moreover, higher 
institutional ownership can partially resolve the free rider problem. All shareholders in the firm 
can benefit from active monitoring carried out by institutional shareholders, who have to bear 
the monitoring cost. Pre-issue institutional ownership suggests that potential monitors are 
already in place. Thus, new investors are more likely to subscribe for new shares from issuers 
that already have potential monitors in place
8
. Pre-issue institutional holding also suggests 
existing institutional investors are already familiar with the stock. Gibson et al. (2004) propose 
that institutional investors have better stock picking ability after finding that institutional 
holdings can separate above-average SEO firms from underperforming firms.  
Since institutional investors have better information than individuals, higher institutional 
ownership implies that more informed institutional investors have put their stamp of approval 
on the firm’s value. Thus, higher institutional ownership signals the better quality of the issuing 
                                                 
8
Zhang (2004) demonstrates that new shares are easier to place when issuing firms have higher pre-issue 
institutional ownership. Huang and Zhang (2011) further find a negative relationship between pre-issue 
institutional ownership and the SEO offer price discount. Liang and Jang (2013) suggest that discounts in PLs 
serve as compensation for investor's costs of assessing firms, while abnormal returns around the announcement 
date reflect information about the quality of the firm. These latter findings are in line with the information 
hypothesis. 
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firm, making it easier for underwriters to market the new offer at a lower discount. To address 
this expectation, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with higher institutional ownership will price offers at a lower discount 
resulting in higher announcement return during the SEO event. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 The Sample  
Our study examines the SEOs of firms traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 
January 1998 through to December 2012. We use this research period because ownership data 
on UK firms only begin in 1997 in Thomson One Banker’s database. Moreover, since 
regulation removed the restriction on the issue size of PLs in January 1996, UK firms in our 
research sample have more discretion to choose the SEO issue method. 
Our sample excludes firms in the financial industry (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–4949), since these firms differ dramatically 
from firms in other industries in their financial reporting, structure, and management. Pure 
secondary and joint issues are also excluded, following the methodology of Slovin et al. (2000). 
To avoid possible skewness on our findings due to a large number of small issues been present 
in our sample, we exclude all issues with proceeds of less than £1 million. The data on issue 
characteristics and ownership information were initially obtained from Thomson One Banker’s 
database. The items relating to each issue include the announcement date, the offer date, the 
closing price one day prior to the announcement date, the offer price, the number of shares in 
the offer, and the issue method. Ownership data include each firm’s investor types, investment 
style, and shareholder equity holdings. Finally, the daily stock price data and financial 
statement data are from Thomson’s Datastream database. 
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After the exclusion of issues with incomplete data, our final sample consists of 697 seasoned 
equity issues, distributed over 15 years, and their issue methods, as shown in Table 1. The 
whole sample of SEOs is categorized into four subsamples by issue type: ROs, PLs, OOs, and 
PLOOs. Table 1 also reports the trends in SEO issue methods over our sample period. Listed 
UK firms conducted 697 SEOs over the period 1998–2012, with 162 ROs, 308 PLs, 63 OOs, 
and 164 PLOOs. There is a general surge in SEOs during 1998–2001. However, the number of 
SEOs dramatically falls to 36 in 2002, followed by resurgence during 2002–2005. The number 
of SEOs reaches its highest level of 142 issues in 2009. A potential interpretation for this 
pattern is the market conditions over the sample period. The increased SEO activity of the 
period 1998-2001 is explained by the impact of the dotcom bubble and the persistent 
overvaluation of shares in those years, followed by a correction in share prices after the burst of 
the bubble in late 2000 and the after effects of September 11 2001. In contrast, the trend in 
issuance activity in the latest years is driven by the 2007-2009 financial crisis where financially 
distressed firms prefer equity to debt to raise additional capital following the shortage of 
liquidity in the money and capital markets. It is clear that PLs are the dominant issue type in our 
sample with 44.19% of all issues considered here.  
 
(Please insert Table 1 here) 
 
This finding is consistent with the evidence of Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) who find the 
proportion of PLs to be highest in UK SEOs during 1996–2007. During 2008–2010, we find 
that almost all UK SEOs were conducted via PLs, with 81.25%, 69.01%, and 76.79% of total 
issues in each of those years. This was mostly driven by the financial crisis and the loss of 
market confidence, as shareholders were unwilling to subscribe for new shares in an RO and 
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OO were just too risky and time consuming when capital was needed instantly by the firms
9
.  
 
3.2 Model Specification 
This paper investigates which factors determine the choice of SEO issue method, price 
discount and SEO announcement return. In addition to ownership variables, we also examine 
the explanatory power of quality-related variables, including offer size (Proceeds/MV), SEO 
price discount (Discount), the natural logarithm of market value (Size), three measures of 
growth opportunity (ROE, MV/BV, Leverage), a measure of pre-announcement returns 
(PastR) and a proxy for market conditions (MCond).  
The hypotheses H1a and H1b propose that the distribution of equity ownership among 
managers and institutional investors can influence the probability of a firm choosing an RO, a 
PL, an OO or a PLOO. These hypotheses are tested using standard and binomial logistic 
regression where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a firm chooses an RO 
(PL/OO/PLOO) and zero for a firm choosing other issue types. The model is specified as: 
 
MCondPastRLeverageBVMV
ROESizenalOCInstitutio
MSODiscountVProceeds/MPLOOOOPLRO
10987
654
321
/
///






     (1) 
 
where, Proceeds/MV is defined as the SEO offer amount divided by the market value of 
equity, which acts as a proxy for offer size. This variable is expected to have positive 
                                                 
9
A characteristics example of this loss in shareholders’ confidence is the case of HBOS’s rights issue in 2008 
which was not taken up as the share price was falling continuously once the financial crisis had struck. 
Shareholders were unwilling to take on instant losses. Placements were the only possible issue method at that 
period as institutional investors were the only possible source of cash given the lack of available bank financing 
and shareholder refusal. 
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(negative) effects on the probability of a firm choosing an RO (PL) (Corwin, 2003; Barnes 
and Walker, 2006). Information cost theory suggests that a larger offer is associated with 
higher information cost. In this setting, larger SEOs are expected to be sold at a higher 
discount, resulting in lower announcement returns (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003).  
Discount is measured as 





1
1
t
t
P
OP , where tOP is the offer price at time t and 1tP  is the 
closing market price on the last day prior to the announcement day. The SEO discount is an 
indirect cost for firms of issuing new shares, based on uncertainty about firm value, gathering 
information, and marketing the new shares (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003). Price impact is 
larger for ROs than for PLs, because in the latter case the offer discount can be lowered by the 
underwriter’s market effort (Rinne and Suominen, 2009). 
As a proxy for managerial entrenchment, MSO is defined as the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding shares owned by all executive and non-executive directors. Institutional OC is 
constructed by the proportion of equity owned by institutional blockholders that own a 
minimum of 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
Size is calculated as the natural log of market valuation. This variable is used as a proxy for 
uncertainty and asymmetric information. Firms with higher information asymmetry are more 
likely to choose a PL over an OO, because PLs can reduce information production costs 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). To ensure the success of an equity issue, the issuing firm 
must provide information to the public and attract larger numbers of investors to purchase new 
shares in the public offer. However, a PL only involves target investors, typically one or a small 
numbers of investors. Therefore, given the level of information asymmetry, a PL incurs lower 
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information costs than an OO
10
.Moreover, smaller firms are expected to sell the shares at a 
larger discount in an SEO, as they are likely to be associated with more uncertainty and 
higher levels of asymmetric information than larger firms (Corwin, 2003; Wu and Wang, 
2005).  
Three variables are used to control for growth opportunity: market-to-book ratio (MV/BV), 
the return on equity (ROE) and leverage. The level of uncertainty about firm value increases 
as the value depends largely on growth opportunities (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). From 
this perspective, issuers with a higher MV/BV ratio, higher ROE and higher leverage are 
expected to have a higher discount to ensure the success of the offering, resulting in lower 
announcement returns. Moreover, the market-to-book ratio can also be interpreted as a 
measure of overvaluation, which is highly related to equity issuing activity (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). Overvalued firms are more likely to choose an RO over a PL, because 
placing investors can assess firm value through their negotiations with issuers (Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993). On the other hand, undervalued firms use PLs to affirm their firm value (Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1992; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Barnes and Walker, 2006).  
PastR is calculated by the pre-announcement stock performance (-60,-2), CAR acting as a 
proxy for the market’s assessment of firm quality and further investment potential. Issuers 
with better past performance have a reduced adverse selection problem, could bring new 
issues to market at a lower discount by means of a placing, and receive higher announcement 
returns (Barnes and Walker, 2006). MCond is calculated by the pre-announcement market 
returns (-60,-2) as a proxy for market conditions.  
We also employ an ordinary least squares regression model to examine how ownership 
variables affect the offer price discounts. This model is algebraically formulated as: 
                                                 
10
Wu (2004) finds that private placement firms have more information asymmetry than public offering firms, 
evidence further corroborated by Gibson et al. (2004) and Chemmanur et al. (2009). 
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MCondPastRLeverageBVMVROE
SizenalOCInstitutioMSOVProceeds/MDiscount
98765
4321
/ 



  (2) 
where all variables are described earlier in this section.  
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the mean values of the key issue and firm characteristics for the whole sample, 
as well as for the four subsamples of SEOs by issue type. According to Panel A, capital 
proceeds average £104.991 million for ROs and £84.479 million for PLs. This finding suggests 
that PLs raise considerably less capital than ROs do, consistent with the findings of Barnes and 
Walker (2006). The average RO discount is 17.85 %, which is close to the findings of Armitage 
(2002) and Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) of 21% and 21.56%, respectively. Moreover, the mean 
offer discount on an RO is the highest among the four issue types. This indicates that issuers 
choosing ROs set the offer at a lower price to guarantee the success of the issue; by contrast, the 
lowest price discount occurs for PLs, with an average of around 8.35%. These results are 
consistent with the restrictions of the LSE with regards to the use of a PL as an issue method 
choice. Since a placing is an invitation to outside investors, the wealth of existing shareholders 
is more likely to decline and dispersion in post-issue equity holdings is likely to be greater than 
in the case of rights issues. To limit such a dilution in ownership, the LSE listing rules stipulate 
that issue proceeds in a placing cannot exceed 5% of the market value of the current share 
capital, unless the excess is approved by the shareholders in an extraordinary general meeting 
with a majority of 75% of the votes. The 5% limitation is relaxed to 10% for shares issued as 
part of a vendor placing, and the offer size of the PL is restricted to 5% of the existing capital in 
any one year and 7.5% in any three years (UK Listing Authority, 2000). The offer discount in a 
placing is limited to at most 10% of the middle market price at the time of the PL. Burton et al. 
(2000) state that existing shareholders generally vote against any proposed share issues as a 
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result of their pre-emption rights,
11
 especially when the proposed discount is higher than 5% 
of the middle market price in reaction to the SEO announcement. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for firm variables in the SEOs. It is notable that 
PL issuers have the highest average managerial ownership, at 12.23%, while lower managerial 
ownership is found for rights-preserving issuers (6.42% for RO, 5.07% for OO respectively). 
Another important finding is that the mean institutional ownership in rights issuers is larger 
than for other issue types. This means that ROs cluster more in firms with higher institutional 
ownership. 
（Please insert Table 2 here） 
 
We now focus on the other firm variables. The average firm size that is measured as the market 
value of equity is higher for RO issuers than for PL issuers (£889.75 million versus £811.93 
million). It is interesting to note that the largest average firm size is that of PLOO issuers, 
around £1,267.43 million. This finding suggests that PLOO issuers cluster more in larger firms. 
We also find that rights issuers have higher returns on equity and higher leverage levels in 
comparison to other issuers. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
To analyse the probability of a firm choosing various SEO issue methods, we conducted the 
logistic regressions shown in Table 3. We modelled the decision to issue an RO, PL, OO, or 
                                                 
11
 Both ROs and OOs give existing shareholders’ pre-emption rights to purchase new shares in proportion to their 
holdings and new shares are offered to other investors only if existing shareholders do not exercise any or just part 
of their pre-emption rights. Thus, ROs and OOs are also called pre-emption issues. However, a placing is a non 
pre-emption issue in which the seasoned shares in the PL are sold at a fixed price to outside investors. Pre-emption 
rights are a principal mechanism to protect shareholders from dilution of their wealth and control in the firm, 
cemented in UK Company Law and the LSE listing rules. 
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PLOO and the results are reported in panels A to D respectively. The dependent variable is 
defined as a binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm chooses one of the methods 
over the others and of zero otherwise. 
In Estimation 1, the value of the dependent variable equals one if the issue is conducted 
through a RO and zero if the issue is conducted by means of another issue method. We find the 
coefficients of Proceeds/MV and Discount to be positive and significant. This result suggests 
that the larger the issue and the higher the offer price discount, the more likely the firm 
conducting the SEO will choose an RO. We then find that managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership have no significant impact on the choice ROs over control diluting 
issues. We also note the significant coefficient for PastR and market condition (MCond), 
suggesting that the probability of a firm conducting an RO is negatively related to past stock 
market performance but positively related to current market performance.  
Estimation 2 reports the results for the probability of a firm choosing a PL. We focus on the 
variables with a significant coefficient in the Estimation, which is, Proceeds/MV, Discount, 
MSO, Institutional OC, Leverage, PastR, and MCond. Both Proceeds/MV and Discount are 
negatively related to the choice of a PLs indicating that a smaller issue and a lower discount 
indicate a higher probability of a UK firm choosing a PL. With respect to the role of MSO, the 
results suggest higher managerial share ownership increases the probability of a firm choosing 
a placing. This supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, where entrenched managers 
can use placings to reinforce their control of the firm (Barclay et al., 2007). The coefficient of 
Institutional OC suggests that the lower pre-issue institutional ownership, the higher the 
probability of a firm choosing the placing issue method. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that firms use placings to improve the monitoring of management (Wruck, 1989). 
The large shareholders created by placings have an incentive to monitor and benefit from their 
monitoring efforts. Furthermore, the benefit of adding such large shareholders should be lower 
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if there are more potential monitors already in place (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; 2005). 
Therefore, hypotheses 1a and 1b are also supported. 
The variable Leverage takes on a negative role, where firms with higher debt levels are less 
likely to issue equity through a placing. A higher leverage level indicates active monitoring by 
debt holders and therefore firms do not have to choose a placing for monitoring purposes. In 
addition, investors are unwilling to buy shares in a highly leveraged firm because it has a 
higher risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. This indicator points to a higher risk of SEO 
failure. Our results also indicate that firms with better past stock performance tend to select PLs 
and this issue method is more popular in a cold market. 
Estimation 3 displays the logistic modelling results for a standalone OO. The coefficients of 
Proceeds/MV and MSO are positive and significant. This finding suggests that firms with 
larger issues and higher managerial ownership are more likely to make OOs. It is noteworthy 
that Size takes on a negative role. Firm size is a proxy for uncertainty and asymmetric 
information. This result implies that an OO is more likely to be chosen in firms with a higher 
level of uncertainty and asymmetric information. As shown in estimation 4, we find that the 
larger the issue, the higher the offer discount and the more favourable market conditions can 
increase the probability of a firm making a PLOO. The Leverage variable has negative and 
statistically significant coefficients, indicating that financially distressed firms are less likely to 
select PLOOs. 
By combining the results of the different models, several variables have a significant effect on 
issue method choice. First are issue characteristics. Firms with larger issues are less likely to 
choose PLs. A larger offer discount increases the probability of choosing an RO or a PLOO but 
decreases the likelihood of using a PL. Second is ownership. Firms with higher managerial 
ownership are more likely to use PLs and OOs, which is consistent with the incentive of 
entrenched managers. Lower institutional ownership can raise the probability of a firm using a 
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placing due to enhanced monitoring. Third are the firm variables. Firm size is negatively 
related to the probability of a firm choosing an OO. Firms with higher leverage are less likely to 
use PLs and PLOOs. However, our results suggest a firm’s return on equity and 
market-to-book ratio have no effect on the choice of SEO. Fourth are firm-specific and market 
conditions. Better stock performance, as a potential proxy for firm quality, is associated with a 
higher probability of choosing PLs and a lower probability of choosing ROs. In a hot market, 
firms are more likely to choose ROs but less likely to conduct equity issues through PLs. This 
evidence supports the findings of Stulz et al. (2014). 
 
(Please insert Table 3 here) 
 
To examine the choice of SEO issue method more explicitly, we also run a series of binomial 
logistic regressions that compares the use of ROs and PLs against the other two methods (OOs 
and PLOOs). The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with our earlier findings on the 
probability of a firm choosing various SEO issue methods but also provide new insights. Firstly, 
higher offer discount firms prefer to conduct ROs rather than PLOOs. Secondly, when the 
choice is between a PL and an OO, firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to 
conduct SEOs through a PL. This evidence confirms the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 
Thirdly, favourable market conditions significantly decrease the probability of a firm choosing 
a PL or a PLOO. Given that a placing is a proxy for value certification, our result implies that 
firm equity is overvalued in a hot market. 
 
(Please insert Table 4 here) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of cross-sectional tests on SEO offer price discounts. The 
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coefficient for proceeds to market value is significantly positive, indicating that the larger the 
issue size, the higher the discount. This result strongly supports Corwin’s (2003) hypotheses of 
downward-sloping demand and price pressure and the empirical evidence of Armitage et al. 
(2014) in their study on the link between demand for shares and discounts in UK OOs and PLs. 
As regards the role of ownership variables in SEO price setting, the coefficients of the two 
ownership variables MSO and Institutional OC are all significant. The positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and offer discounts can be explained by the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. Managers have an incentive to place shares with those buyers who 
may be passive investors or managerial investors. Thus, a higher discount needs to be used to 
compensate for lower levels of monitoring (Barclay et al., 2007). However, firms with higher 
institutional ownership tend to offer a lower discount. Under the monitoring hypothesis, the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is reduced by the presence of 
institutional monitors. Moreover, investors are more likely to participate in the PL if the issuer 
already has active monitors (usually institutional investors), because they can directly benefit 
from existing monitoring and do not have to be concerned about the free rider problem. 
Additionally, large institutional holdings imply the stock’s value has been approved by 
institutional investors. Therefore, in this case it is easier for the firm to issue new shares 
resulting in a lower offer discount. 
We also find that smaller firms are more likely to set the discount at a high level. This result 
implies firms have to offer a deeper discount to compensate for the high level of information 
asymmetry (e.g. Corwin, 2003). Leverage has a significantly negative effect, which is 
inconsistent with the theory that high leverage reduces information asymmetry due to 
monitoring by creditors. This evidence indicates that, to guarantee the success of an SEO, a 
financially distressed firm must price its offer with a high discount. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that a pre-issue stock run-up decreases the offer discount. 
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Better stock performance reveals positive information to the market, which can increase 
investor willingness to participate in the SEO. Another important finding is that the offer price 
discount is higher when the market is hot. This can be explained as equity issues cluster in a hot 
market, such that the competition among issuers intensifies. Therefore, a firm has to use a 
higher discount to gain investor attention. 
 
(Please insert Table 5 here) 
 
Table 6 reports the cross-sectional analysis of SEO announcement returns. The dependent 
variable is defined as the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) with respect to 
the announcement date
12
. Based on the results, the offer price discount is negatively related to 
the announcement return in all estimations. The offer discount can appear to be a signal of firm 
quality to the market (e.g. Slovin et al., 2000; Balachandran et al., 2008; Liang and Jang, 2013). 
Hence, lower price discount signals that the firm has high quality and thus the market response 
to its SEO will be more favourable, resulting in higher announcement returns. 
Regarding the relationship between market performance and ownership structure, the 
coefficient of MSO is negative (-0.026) and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
an inverse relationship between managerial share ownership and market reaction. This result 
can possibly be explained by managerial entrenchment hypothesis. As entrenched managers 
have more discretion to pursue their own wealth maximising strategies, they could sometimes 
                                                 
12
 We choose Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to estimate the time-series daily portfolio return. Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model can be written formally as Rit – Rft= αi+ βi (Rmt - Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt+miMOMt+ εit. 
The author proposed four stock market factors – excess market return (Rmt -Rft), size (SMBt), book to market (HML) 
and momentum (MOM)– that have strong explanatory power for the differences in the average returns across 
stocks. αi is the average daily abnormal return (AR) on the portfolio of issuers over the estimated period. 
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act against firms’ interests; especially if the additional capital is raised via placing the new 
shares with passive investors. In such cases we would expect high MSO to lead to higher 
discounts and therefore lower announcement returns which is exactly what our results suggest. 
On the contrary, we find that larger pre-issue institutional ownership leads to a better SEO 
outcome. The coefficient reported is 0.014 significant at the 5% level. This result can possibly 
be attributed to the strong monitoring carried out by institutional investors which may press 
managers into making optimal financing and investment decisions so the rest of the 
shareholders can benefit from this effort. Therefore, based on these results, hypotheses 2a and 
2b are accepted.  
Moreover, we find that a higher announcement return can be driven by better pre-issue stock 
performance. The market condition results suggest that market reactions to announcements are 
more favourable in a hot market, leading to a lower indirect cost of issuing equity. This finding 
strongly supports the market timing hypothesis
13
. Firms are market timers. They are more 
likely to make an issue of seasoned equity when the cost of equity is temporarily low.  
To examine whether the issue method can influence market reactions to SEO announcements, 
we further included four dummy variables, namely RO, PL, OO, and PLOO. Consistent with 
our earlier findings, ROs incur a negative market reaction (-0.013), while market reactions to 
PLs are more favourable (0.072). Both results are significant at the 5% level. 
 
(Please insert Table 6 here) 
 
A potential explanation for the latter result is that a PL is a proxy for firm value certification. 
                                                 
13
 Our results corroborate the findings of Dionysiou (2015) which suggest that the market tends to over-react in 
the case of UK firms conducting pure placings and reports weak evidence on the link between PLs and market 
timing. 
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Shares in a PL are usually purchased by institutional investors, who are expected to have 
superior information about firm value. As a result, the market believes that a placing is less 
likely to be conducted by an overvalued firm (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 
2003). Furthermore, market reaction for the cases of OO and PLOOs is reported as positive 
(0.013) and negative (-0.069). However, these results are statistically insignificant.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper extends the existing knowledge of SEOs’ issue methods along the following three 
lines: the probability of the choices of alternative SEO methods, SEO price setting, and market 
reactions to SEO announcements. We focused on the influence of firm ownership structure on 
these issues by constructing two measures, namely, managerial share ownership and 
institutional ownership. Using a sample of UK SEOs, we examined how and why firms choose 
one issue method over another in SEO issuance, differentiating between four major methods, 
namely, ROs, PLs, OOs, and PLOOs. Our results provide reliable evidence to strongly support 
the argument that the use of placings can strengthen managerial control (Barclay et al. 2007). 
Our results also suggest that firms with higher managerial ownership are most likely to choose 
a placing, consistent with the findings of Barnes and Walker (2006). Institutional ownership, as 
a proxy for monitoring effects, is negatively associated with the probability of conducting an 
SEO by means of a PL. Given that a PL can improve the monitoring of management, firms that 
already have monitors are less likely to implement a placing. 
This paper also analyses the role of ownership in SEO price setting. Our results indicate that for 
issuing firms with a high level of managerial ownership, investors may require large offer price 
discounts, since the stocks of these firms suffer from lower market liquidity. We also find 
empirical evidence to support the monitoring hypothesis. Since institutional holdings relate to 
the verification of firm quality, firms with higher institutional ownership are likely to set the 
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offer price at a higher level (lower discount). 
Furthermore, this study examines market reactions to SEOs under alternative ownership 
structure. Our findings show that SEO announcement returns decrease with managerial 
ownership as a result of increased agency problems and adverse selection costs. Investors 
believe that entrenched managers have a strong incentive to issue equity when firms are 
overvalued. Moreover, institutional ownership has a positive effect on SEO announcement 
returns, which is also consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
Notably, our results also strongly support market timing theory. Announcement returns are 
higher (lower) when SEOs are conducted in a hot (cold) market. Firms are likely to issue equity 
when the indirect cost is relatively low. Further, firms are likely to choose ROs when the stock 
market is favourable, while they prefer PLs in a cold market. Since a placing is a value 
certification, overvalued (undervalued) firms are less (more) likely to choose a placing as the 
issue method. Our results imply that SEOs in a hot market are likely to be motivated by firm 
overvaluation. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Issuer characteristics / Source: Thomson One Banker 
Discount 
1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1is the closing market price on day -1 
prior to the announcement day. 
Proceeds 
Gross proceeds. For missing data, the value is constructed as the number of new shares 
issue times the offer price. 
Proceeds/MV The ratio of proceeds divided by the issuer’s market value. 
RO Dummy that takes the value of one for an RO and of zero otherwise. 
PL Dummy that takes the value of one for a PL and of zero otherwise. 
OO Dummy that takes the value of one for an OO and of zero otherwise. 
PLOO Dummy that takes the value of one for a PLOO and of zero otherwise. 
 
Ownership characteristics / Source: Thomson One Banker 
MSO 
Managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and 
non-executive directors. 
Institutional OC 
Institutional ownership concentration, comprised of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of 
the firm’s shares held by all institutional investors. 
 
Firm characteristics / Source: Datastream 
MV Issuer’s market value. 
Size Natural logarithm of market value. 
ROE Ratio of net income to the book value of equity. 
MV/BV Ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
PastR Past stock performance, defined as the CAAR for SEO firms during the estimated 
period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day. 
MCond Past market condition defined as the cumulative equal-weighted market returns during 
the estimated period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day. 
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Table 1 - Trends in UK SEO Issue Methods, 1998–2012 
This table presents the annual number of SEOs listed on the LSE from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2012. The whole 
sample of SEOs is categorized into four subsamples by issue type: ROs, PLs, OOs, and PLOOs. 
 
Year RO PL OO PLOO Total RO% PL% OO% PLOO% Total% 
1998 7 5 1 5 18 38.89 27.78 5.56 27.78 100 
1999 8 9 1 4 22 36.36 40.91 4.55 18.18 100 
2000 14 15 2 10 41 34.15 36.59 4.88 24.39 100 
2001 18 43 7 10 78 23.08 55.13 8.97 12.82 100 
2002 9 7 9 11 36 25.00 19.44 25.00 30.56 100 
2003 10 9 3 20 42 23.81 21.43 7.14 47.62 100 
2004 10 9 7 25 51 19.61 17.65 13.73 49.02 100 
2005 17 5 1 32 55 30.91 9.09 1.82 58.18 100 
2006 14 12 2 19 47 29.79 25.53 4.26 40.43 100 
2007 12 10 7 4 33 36.36 30.30 21.21 12.12 100 
2008 3 26 2 1 32 9.38 81.25 6.25 3.13 100 
2009 31 98 7 6 142 21.83 69.01 4.93 4.23 100 
2010 3 43 5 5 56 5.36 76.79 8.93 8.93 100 
2011 4 9 6 6 25 16.00 36.00 24.00 24.00 100 
2012 2 8 3 6 19 10.53 42.11 15.79 31.58 100 
Total 162 308 63 164 697 23.24 44.19 9.04 23.53 100 
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Table 2 - Issue and Firm Characteristics of SEOs 
This table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of issue (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) for UK SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) from 1998 to 2012 All SEOs 
are divided into four subsamples, by issue type, that is, ROs, PLs, OOs, and PLOOs. Issue characteristics are obtained from Thomson One Banker. Financial factors are obtained from 
Datastream. In this table, Proceeds is the SEO offer amount in millions of British pounds; discount is defined as 1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1 is the closing market price on 
day -1 prior to the announcement day; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises 
aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s shares held by all institutional investors; MV is the market value of the firm’s equity; ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity; 
MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; and leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
 
RO PL OO PLOO Total 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Panel A Issue characteristics 
Proceeds ( £mil) 104.991 108.069 84.479 95.848 64.722 93.960 92.798 115.855 89.569 103.380 
Discount (%) 17.850 16.686 8.350 8.765 10.770 13.540 15.430 13.530 12.468 12.183 
 
Panel B SEO firm characteristics 
MSO (%) 6.415 13.330 12.230 19.835 5.070 8.939 7.089 12.474 9.031 15.625 
Institution OC (%) 35.628 26.152 33.693 22.121 31.435 23.757 32.504 23.216 33.710 23.501 
MV (£mil) 889.747 1214.850 811.926 1768.850 603.738 1718.810 1267.430 2259.500 954.039 1507.945 
ROE (%) 13.110 16.950 3.450 11.010 10.050 14.480 5.731 28.520 6.847 16.849 
MV/BV 3.053 4.510 2.671 3.376 2.618 2.765 3.426 3.305 2.937 3.574 
Leverage (%) 0.280 0.226 0.245 0.200 0.269 0.214 0.208 0.200 0.247 0.208 
No. of Obs. 162 308 63 164 697 
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Table 3 –Logistic Regression of SEO Issue Method Choices 
This table reports the results of modelling the probability of choosing one of four alternative SEO methods using a multivariate logistic regression calculated as 
MCondPastRLeverageBVMVROESizenalOCInstitutioMSODiscountVProceeds/MPLOOOOPLRO 10987654321 ////   ,  
where dependent variable in Estimation1/2/3/4 is one for firms choosing ROs/PLs/OOs/PLOOs and zero for firms choosing other issue methods; Proceeds/MV is the SEO offer 
amount divided by the market value of equity; Discount is defined as 1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1 is the closing market price on day -1 prior to the announcement 
day; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at 
least 3% of the firm’s shares held by all institutional investors; Size is the log of the market value of equity; ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity; MV/BV is 
the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; PastR is past stock performance, which is defined as the CAAR 
for SEO firms during the estimated period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day; and, finally, MCond is defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same 
estimated period. The sample comprises 697 UK SEOs during 1998–2012. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The p-values for the chi-squared test statistic are 
shown in square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
Variables ROs PLs OOs PLOOs 
 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept  -0.470*** [0.000]  0.605 [0.622] -1.225*** [0.004]  -2.036*** [0.000] 
Proceeds/MV 0.059** [0.034] -0.202*** [0.002]  0.311** [0.044]  0.289*** [<.0001] 
Discount 0.220** [0.032] -0.460* [0.092] -0.188 [0.845]  0.558* [0.096] 
MSO 0.065 [0.307]  0.019** [0.043]  0.034** [0.003] -0.015 [0.111] 
Institutional OC 0.091 [0.139] -0.075** [0.027] -0.016 [0.807] -0.069 [0.525] 
Size -0.038 [0.383]  0.056 [0.140] -0.276** [0.013]  0.133 [0.460] 
ROE (%) 0.038 [0.150] -0.081 [0.762]  0.021 [0. 221] -0.055 [0.940] 
MV/BV 0.093 [0.231] -0.036 [0.544]  0.032 [0.149] -0.172 [0.405] 
Leverage 0.344 [0.521] -1.110** [0.032] -0.188 [0.787] -1.298*** [0.008] 
PastR  -1.469** [0.028] 1.512*** [0.000]  2.331 [0.598]  2.421 [0.449] 
MCond   8.967*** [0.000] -2.100** [0.013] -2.398 [0.122]  3.506*** [0.009] 
Pseudo-R2 0.132 
 
0.158 
 
0.133 
 
0.137 
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Table 4 – Binomial Logistic Regressions of SEO Issue Method Choices 
This table reports the results of modelling the probability of choosing one of four alternative SEO methods using a binomial logistic regression calculated as 
MCondPastRLeverageBVMVROESizenalOCInstitutioMSODiscountVProceeds/MPLOOOOPLRO 10987654321 ////    
where Proceeds/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by the market value of equity; Discount is defined as 1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1 is the closing market 
price on day -1 prior to the announcement day; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; 
Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s shares held by all institutional investors; Size is the log of the market value of equity; ROE is the ratio of net 
income over the book value of equity; MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; PastR is past 
stock performance, which is defined as the CAAR for SEO firms during the estimated period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day; and, finally, MCond is defined as cumulative 
equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. The sample comprises 697 UK SEOs during 1998-2012. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The 
p-values for the chi-squared test statistic are shown in square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables RO versus PL RO versus OO RO versus PLOO PL versus OO PL versus PLOO OO versus PLOO 
 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept   -2.150*** [0.008]  -0.258 [0.805]  -0.551** [0.035]   1.892* [0.083]   1.599** [0.042]  -0.293 [0.780] 
Proceeds/MV    1.002** [0.027]   0.123* [0.058]   0.151** [0.014]  -0.989* [0.096]  -1.211 [0.014]   0.221 [0.755] 
Discount    0.480** [0.038]   0.323 [0.635]   0.631* [0.091]  -0.157 [0.795]   0.151 [0.576]   0.308 [0.600] 
MSO   -0.012** [0.037]  -0.018 [0.112]  -0.060 [0.583]   0.029** [0.030]   0.052 [0.673]  -0.024** [0.040] 
Institutional OC    0.124** [0.028]   0.165 [0.854]   0.399* [0.037]   0.031* [0.067]   0.025 [0.828]   0.056 [0.533] 
Size    0.403*** [0.000]   0.178* [0.066]  -0.234 [0.352]   0.581*** [0.000]  -0.168 [0.117]  -0.413** [0.010] 
ROE (%)    0.013 [0.397]   0.145 [0.498]   0.010 [0.532]   0.013 [0.129]  -0.030 [0.871]  -0.013 [0.120] 
MV/BV    0.357 [0.448]  -0.259 [0.742]   0.261 [0.554]    0.097 [0.902]   0.096 [0.821]  -0.015 [0.900] 
Leverage    0.337** [0.015]   0.611 [0.526]   1.711 [0.317]  -0.274 [0.779]  -1.374** [0.040]  -1.100 [0.265] 
PastR   -1.436*** [0.000]   1.613 [0.685]   1.207 [0.455]   1.175* [0.080]  -1.115** [0.013]  -1.594 [0.729] 
MCond    4.172*** [0.000]  -3.134 [0.699]   5.361*** [0.000]  -4.359*** [0.001]    1.439 [0.251]   5.503** [0.012] 
Pseudo-R2 0.118 
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Table 5 - Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of SEO Offer Price Discounts 
This table presents the regression results of the SEO discount on issuer financial variables, ownership variables, 
and market conditions for UK SEOs from 1998 to 2012, estimated as 
MCondPastRLeverageBVMV
ROESizenalOCInstitutioMSOVProceeds/MDiscount
9876
54431
/ 

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  
where Discount is defined as 1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1 is the closing market price on day 
-1 prior to the announcement day; Proceeds/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by the market value of equity; 
MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and 
nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s shares held by 
all institutional investors; Size is the log of the market value of equity; ROE is the ratio of net income over the 
book value of equity; MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; Leverage is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets; PastR is past stock performance, which is defined as the CAAR for SEO 
firms during the estimated period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day; and finally, MCond is defined as 
cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effects. The sample comprises 697 UK SEOs during 1998–2012. The p-values for the 
chi-squared test statistic are shown in square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept 0.300*** [<.0001] 
Proceeds/MV 0.827*** [0.004] 
MSO 0.026*** [0.008] 
Institutional OC -0.010*** [0.000] 
Size -0.250** [0.013] 
ROE (%) -0.024 [0.692] 
MV/BV -0.712 [0.313] 
Leverage 0.997* [0.039] 
PastR -7.440** [0.013] 
MCond 3.476*** [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2 0.125 
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Table 6 - Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of SEO Announcement Returns 
This table presents the results of the three-day average excess returns on issuer financial variables, ownership variables, and market conditions for UK SEOs from 1998 to 2012, estimated as: 
PLOOOOPLROMCondPastRLeverageBVMVROESizenalOCInstitutioMSODiscountVProceeds/MCAAR ////]1,1[ 1110987654321  
where Proceeds/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by the market value of equity; Discount is defined as 1- (OPt/Pt-1), where OPt is the offer price and Pt-1 is the closing market price on day -1 
prior to the announcement day; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate 
blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s shares held by all institutional investors; Size is the log of the market value of equity; ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity; MV/BV is the 
ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; PastR is past stock performance, which is defined as the CAAR for SEO firms during 
the estimated period [-60, -2] prior to the announcement day; and, finally, MCond is defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. All regressions include year 
and industry fixed effects. The p-values for the chi-squared test statistic are shown in square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept    0.162 [0.284]     0.157 [0.312]  0.185 [0.231]   0.179 [0.243] 
Proceeds/MV    0.105 [0.187]     0.156 [0.420]  0.082 [0.298]   0.085 [0.284] 
Discount   -0.205* [0.074]    -0.203* [0.075]  -0.196* [0.076]   -0.160* [0.080] 
MSO   -0.024** [0.011]    -0.026** [0.010]   -0.018** [0.010]    -0.037** [0.010] 
Institutional OC    0.014** [0.028]     0.014** [0.028] 0.014 [0.027]   0.014* [0.030] 
Size    0.437* [0.095]     0.365* [0.095]   0.399* [0.067]   0.353* [0.094] 
ROE (%)   -0.151 [0.647]    -0.160 [0.631] -0.019 [0.597] -0.016 [0.619] 
MV/BV   -0.104 [0.259]    -0.101 [0.283] -0.100 [0.281] -0.100 [0.286] 
Leverage    0.094 [0.489]     0.110 [0.421] 0.111 [0.413] -0.088 [0.521] 
PastR 2.214* [0.079] 2.524* [0.057]  2.503* [0.058]  2.497* [0.056] 
MCond 4.349** [0.033] 4.185* [0.086]   4.380** [0.020]   4.620** [0.024] 
RO   -0.013** [0.027] 
  
    
PL 
  
0.072** [0.018]     
OO 
    
0.013 [0.163]   
PLOO 
    
  -0.069 [0.244] 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.053  0.054   0.051 
 
